Chinese Civilization Has Its Own Course of Development

Trans. from Chinese by Sherwin Lu (including quotations from classics if not otherwise indicated)

EDITOR’S NOTE: This is a shortened translation of another excerpt from the book China Saves the World – Chinese culture being the solution to current human crises (《中国拯救世界—应对人类危机的中国文化》), Chap. 4, “Historical Dimension of the ‘China model’ ”, Section 2), by Mr. Yuzhong Zhai (翟玉忠), contract research fellow, Center for Chinese and Global Affairs, Beijing University, China, and founder and general editor of the New Legalist website (Chinese and English). A forthcoming sequel to this excerpt is entitled “Non-Partisanship of Traditional Chinese Politics”.

Many scholars, Chinese as well as Western (for instance, the American sinologist Lucian Pye), have argued long since that China has not been a “state” but a civilization. They are right, because China was not preconditioned to become a modern nation-state. The English geographer and a founder of geopolitics and geostrategy Sir Halford John Mackinder (1861—1947) pointed out in his essay “The geographical pivot of history” that the concept of state was formed under specific historical conditions and such conditions never seemed to be present in Chinese history.

By the end of Yuan and Qing dynasties, Zhu Yuanzhang (朱元璋) and Sun Yat-sen (孙中山) respectively put forward the slogan of “Drive out northern invaders and restore China”, but during Ming dynasty when there was not so much pressure from outside, “Ming” became the synonym for “all-under-heaven” again. Then in the century after Sun, China was faced with continuous pressure from outside and especially, after the end of the cold war, the U.S. added to its strategic weight over the East side of Eurasia, triggering the recent upsurge of nationalism in China. However, China is still yet to finally shape her concepts about a “state” and the Chinese government today is keeping a close watch over the rising nationalist trend with an ambiguous attitude.

Since remote times, China has all along been an integrated civilization formed through continuing free migration and free marriages between different ethnic-cultural groups, with its whole territory and population under one sovereign. The Book of Poetry says: “All the land under heaven belongs to the Son of Heaven; all the people on it are his subjects.” This means all the wealth, of which land was the most important, belonged to all people on an equal footing, though it has often been cited by Westernized intellectuals as evidence of political and economic despotism. But if read in its whole context, the absurdity of the misinterpretation as “despotism” is very obvious, because immediately following the above quote is the author’s complaint against an official’s unequal treatment of people: “But the officer is not fair, assigning me to public services all the time as if I were the only able person.” (溥天之下，莫非王土; 率土之滨，莫非王臣。大夫不均，我从事独贤。《诗经·小雅·北山》)

By the end of the last century, Ms. Wangping Shao (邵望平) of the archeology department of China Social Sciences Academy, relying on a large amount of archeological discoveries related to the history of the Three Dynasties, proved that the territories of the “Nine Provinces” as mentioned in the Classic of History· The Tribute of Yu (《尚书·禹贡》) roughly coincided with the Yellow-Yangtze river basin cultural circle of the Longshan Age (龙山时代), that the articles of tribute recorded in the book accurately reflected the contributions from each of those different cultural regions during the preliminary period of Chinese civilization, and that the concept of “Nine Provinces” was not a conjecture imposed on ancient history as alleged by some early 20^th century scholars, but represented a historical fact. (《禹贡“九州”的考古学研究》，载苏秉琦主编《考古学文化论集》二，文物出版社，1989年，第29页。)

Many facts verified by archeological discoveries indicate that The Tribute of Yu is a truthful record of the political-economic order in the formative years of Chinese civilization and that Xia dynasty was not an alliance of city-states but an integrated political-economic entity incorporating nine different cultural regions.

In her study of The Tribute of Yu, Ms. Shao already noticed that the author viewed the Nine Provinces from an angle of vision which overlooked all these cultural regions from a central point where was located the capital of the Three Dynasties. The capital together with its suburban areas had attained the highest civilization and was most powerful as the pillar of the central dynasty. Around it were a myriad of states of various sizes. According to Zhan Guo Ce (《战国策· 齐策四》) and Lüshi Chunqiu (《吕氏春秋·离俗览·用民》), in the times of Yu the Great there were ten thousand such states and during the reign of Tang of Shang three thousand. When confronted with so many potential rivals on the same vast landmass, it was impossible for the central dynasty to unify all of them through colonization. The only choice was to join together through natural integration between different ethnic cultures till a unitary civilization finally took shape.

If we look at China’s map today, we can see that Chinese civilization has radiated uniformly in all directions from the “central region” as recorded in The Tribute of Yu, or, in other words, the distances from the heartland of Chinese civilization to the four borders are roughly equal. What a miracle was created by history!

The way Chinese civilization spread out taught our ancestors to pay much attention to coexistence of diverse cultures -- as represented by the word “和” (harmony) in classical Chinese political theories -- and to the justice of war – “德” (benevolence) and “义” (justice). They would reject the policy for absolute advantage such as invariably practiced in modern Western diplomacy. In foreign affairs the Chinese attached importance to mutual help and peaceful coexistence between big and small states, regarding war only as the last resort. It is worth note here that this was also a principle for legitimacy in the times of the First Emperor of Qin.

The Classic of History· The Canon of Yao (《尚书·尧典》) recorded the following as among Yao’s great achievements: “Public affairs involving the numerous clans were lucidly and justly managed; the myriad states were unified in harmony; and the people changed with the times, becoming friendly and amiable.” This fact of “myriad states unified in harmony” here finds an echo in what today’s Chinese government has proposed as “a harmonious world”, although moderns are totally ignorant of the sophisticated principles of political economy underlying it.

The Tale of King Mu, Son of Heaven (《穆天子传》) is generally known as a historical record of the king’s travels to the Western Regions. It shows that, even long before Zhang Qian (张骞) was sent there as an envoy during Han dynasty, there had already been some contacts between central China and those border regions. This fact has been verified by later archeological discoveries. For instance, Jade from Hetian (和田玉, in today’s Xinjiang, China) was discovered in Shang dyansty tombs. King Mu was accompanied by a huge army, but it was not a “Crusade of Western Zhou”. What he saught was, besides material exchanges, acceptance of the central kingdom’s culture by those Western Region states. In his thank-you speech addressed to Queen Mother of the West, he said: “I am returning to the East to bring about harmony among the Xia states. When all the peoples are equal, I will come back to see you again.” The promise here to “bring about harmony among the Xia states” was meant the same as “myriad states unified in harmony” in the times of Yao. Obviously, there has been no essential change in the guiding principle for handling relations between states during China’s three different historical eras from remote antiquity to the very present.

In order to bring about harmony among all states, classical Chinese theory on foreign relations gives priority to that between big and small states. This is typical of the Chinese way of thinking and academic learning. Just as our ancestors paid special attention to the relation between the more and the less advantaged and to the process from inequality to equality in internal political economy, they were most concerned about the relation between the powerful and the weak in external relations, instead of starting from certain abstract concepts as a priori principles and then interpreting reality in terms of such conceptual principles as has been the way with mainstream Western scholars. The Discarded History of the Zhou Dynasty recorded: “All states, big or small, were mutually supportive. The Son of Heaven of Zhou dynasty appointed governors, one for each state, according to their ability, specified their duties, and designated their tributes according to what each state has. (《逸周书·职方解第六十二》)

“All states, big or small, were mutually supportive.” – This was not diplomatic rhetoric but historical reality in traditional China. One can find many instances in the Zuo Zhuan (《左传》). Our ancestors believed that for powerful states to assist the weaker ones was in line with Propriety rules (礼) for managing foreign affairs because it was a guarantee for peace. As Zi Chan (子产), a historically-known statesman in the Spring and Autumn period, put it: “The virtuous approach that a big power should adopt towards a small state is manifested in five ways: Pardon its sins; Forgive its faults; Rescue it from disasters; Praise its rule of virtue and justice; Give advice when its leaders are not thoughtful enough. In this way, small states would not be caught up in a plight. They will feel indebted and pledge allegiance to the big power as if returning home.” (《左传·襄公二十八年》)

In 661 bc, when Northern Di (狄) invaded Xing (邢), a small principality, Guan Zhong (管仲) suggested to Duke Huan of Qi (齐桓公) that Qi should help defend Xing. Two years later, Duke Huan of Qi, Duke Huan of Song (宋桓公) and Duke Zhao of Cao (曹昭公) brought their armies together to Xing’s rescue when the latter’s troops were already in disarray. On expelling the Di troops and retrieving what valuables they had grabbed from Xing, the allied forces returned all to Xing without taking any for themselves. That summer, when Xing moved their capital to a new location, the allied troops again lent a helping hand in constructing city walls for better defense. The historian who recorded this true story stressed that It was a principle of Propriety for the different states to help each other in times of adversity, share the hardships, and fight together against offenders. (《左传·僖公元年》)

Moral obligation to other states was not restricted to military aids. It might also relate to economy. In the winter of 717 bc, on hearing an envoy from the central capital reporting famine there, Duke Yin of Lu (鲁隐公) sought to buy grains for him from Song (宋), Wei (卫), Qi (齐), Zeng (郑) . This was in compliance with Propriety, commented again by the same historian. (《左传·隐公六年》)

“Placing oneself below” with “feminine softness”in external military affairs implies deploying troops only as the last resort to maintain justice and obeying war ethics. Laozi said: “Sharp weapons are inauspicious instruments. Everyone hates them. Therefore the man of the Way is not comfortable with them.” (兵者不祥之器，非君子之器，不得已而用之。Dao De Jing, Chap 31, Trans. by Charles Muller.) The same idea in similar wording also appeared in ancient Chinese military classics such as the Six Secret Teachings (《六韬·文韬·兵道》).

The principle of “mutual support between big and small states” was already well established in China during the time of the Warring States and Western Han. For example, Lüshi Chunqiu, the encyclopedic Chinese classic text compiled around 239 bc under the patronage of the Qin Chancellor Lü Buwei (吕不韦), while criticizing pacifism represented by Mohists, pointed out the necesity for just wars: “Ancient sage-kings stood for just wars and did not totally abolish any wars. Wars have been happenning for long ever since the beginning of human existence… If a war is just in its purpose to punish a tyrant and rescue the people from sufferings, people will welcome it in the same way as a filial son meets his loving parents or a hungry man sees delicious food. People rush at tyrants like arrows from strong bows shooting into a deep valley or long-cumulated floods bursting a dam. Under such circumstances, even a mediocre ruler would not be able to keep hold of his subjects. How could a tyrant?” (《吕氏春秋·孟秋纪·荡兵》)

The author of Yellow Emperor’s Four Canons, an important Western Han Daoist-Legalist classic, sharing with Laozi the idea of Yin (feminine) principle of non-aggressiveness, distinguished three kinds of wars, i.e., for spoils, for justice, and for vengeance, and pointed out that only those fighting for justice are invincible:

“Just wars are supposed to help suppress a rebellion or overthrow a tyrant in another state in order to remove the vicious and promote the virtuous. When fighting for justice, people are willing to sacrifice themselves. So, the rulers of powerful states usually annex other ones under the banner of justice but seldom push the principle of justice through to the end. Without consistency, initially just wars would also end in injustice.

“Wars may also grow out of bitter resentment if the bitterness is not dissolved in other ways. But such wars intended for revenge can lead to nowhere. Even if one wins the war, the resentment may come back on himself, because venting one’s bitterness is not the right way to solve disputes.

“The right approach to war is to always stay on the defensive side. That means you are forced to fight back when a war is imposed on you. Just because you are defensive, you will win unfailing moral support. So, to yield at first is to leave room for winning a counterattack; to refrain from firing the first shot is to pave the way for a final victory. This is the way to be invincible.” (The Yellow Emperor’s Four Canons • Basic Principle for War, 《黄帝四经 • 本伐》)

To put it in a nutshell, “external affairs should be based on justice supported by force” as was recorded in another classic Discarded History of the Zhou Dynasty (“外事武而义”,《逸周书·武纪解第六十八》). This is one of the characteristics typical of the Chinese civilization. As the world is witnessing the U.S.-headed NATO bullying other countries today, we wonder if our scholars are aware that there could be a nobler principle for international relations and a world order based on it.

It is worth note that the above principle for inter-state relations in Chinese tradition functioned within a unified feudal political system of the Zhou dynasty. The vassal states of that time were totally different from contemporary nation-states in that the former were not independent sovereign states. As early as Western Zhou, the weights and measures and form of writing were already tending toward uniformity. For instance, the Large Seal script (大篆) written by Zhou (籀, a personal name here), a minister under King Xuan of Zhou (周宣王), was already a standardized form of writing. As recorded in the Book of Rites: “[The Duke of Zhou] gave audience to the feudal princes in the Hall of Distinction, worked out ceremonial rites and music and issued uniform weights and measures, thus winning submission from all under heaven.” (《礼记·明堂位第十四》)

More than that, traditional China has also been a wholly integrated civilization since antiquity. There was no such idea as Western-style regional or national “autonomy” in classical Chinese political theories. Although the term “self-rule” (自治) did appear frequently in the Book of Lord Shang, what the author meant, however, was for people to discipline themselves in compliance to the rule of a uniform law so as to minimize legal punishments. This was the political ideal of ancient Chinese for a universal great order founded on “small communities with small populations” (小国寡民, Dao De Jing, 80).

But in early 20^th century, the Western idea of limited autonomy being granted to lower-level political authority by a central or regional government was introduced to China and became a prevailing trend of thought at one time. Incompatible though it was with China’s tradition and reality, many political forces still tried hard to push for regional autonomy just to seek political advantage from the unpredictable situation of the time, while ready to dismiss the idea if ever successful in winning the state power. Later on, the Chinese Communists, following after the Soviet Union, revised the Western idea of “regional autonomy” into that of autonomy of minority nationalities in limited areas, thus foreboding today’s troubles in Tibet and Xinjiang.

Meanwhile, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen did not think that centralized government was fit for China. He advocated the kind of federalism as was practiced by the U.S. Therefore, the provisional constitution drafted by the Nanking government after the 1911 Revolution was modeled after the U.S. federal constitution. But later, regional autonomy was stopped by order of Yuan Shikai in 1914, after he gained preliminary nationwide control of the chaotic situation, under the pretext that “all regional autonomous organs were not good” which would “hinder the functioning of government”.

On Yuan’s death in 1916, however, the autonomy movement regained momentum on the provincial level nationwide. In early 1920s, all the provinces pushed for their own constitutions, and Hunan, Zhejiang, Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guangdong had instituted their provincial constitutions by 1925. But in 1926 when the KMT-led Northern Expeditionary Army marched into Hunan, the provincial autonomy there was immediately terminated with its parliament dissolved. So were the autonomy movements in other provinces.

The Communist Party of China (CPC) in its earlier years was also for Western-style federalism as was indicated in its documents from the manifesto of its Second National Congress in 1922 to the October 10, 1947 Manifesto of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, which latter was drafted by Mao Zedong in person, all calling for a “free federal China” (which concept was deleted later and is no more in its current version). Not until 1949, when the common program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) was being formulated, did the CPC leaders finally decide to adopt “regional autonomy of ethnic minorities” instead of federalism to regulate ethnic relations and “democratic centralism” instead of local autonomy to regulate relations between the central and local governments. The top leaders of the CPC were quite realistic in handling this issue as can be seen in Zhou Enlai’s Sept. 7, 1949 report to the CPPCC:

“China is a multi-ethnic country. One basic feature is that a great majority of her population, amounting to over 400 million, is of the Han nationality while that of all ethnic minorities put together… accounts for less than 10% of the national population. It goes without saying that all nationalities should be equal and that the Hans should first of all treat all the other nationalities with respect regarding their religion, language and customs. But the issue I am addressing now is whether our policy towards nationalities should be aimed at autonomy or beyond that. We are for autonomy of minority nationalities but we must be vigilant against imperialists’ exploiting the ethnic minority issue to sow discord and spoil our national unity… It is for this reason that the name of our country is the People’s Republic of China, not a federation.” (《周恩来统一战线文选》，人民出版社，1984年，39~140页, 《关于人民政协的几个问题》。)

This was an important turning point in China’s political arrangement with regard to ethnic relations, marking the fading out of the Western idea of local autonomy from Chinese intellectuals’ field of vision. Under the influence of the international situation of that time, however, the Chinese government accepted from the Soviet Union not only its concept of nationality but also its idea of autonomy of minority nationalities, i.e., the institution of autonomous political entities in areas inhabited by minority peoples, which later proved to be not advisable for artificially enhancing a nationality’s self-awareness, aggravating ethnic conflicts and finally, when chance occurs, catalyzing independence of autonomous areas and disruption of national unity. This is a lesson no one can afford to ignore.

In light of what has been characteristic of the integrated civilization of China, the state government should promote ethnic integration and centralized administration of all areas through internal migration and assigning of local administrators by the central government, such as, to cite instances from history, sending troops and/or civilians to settle in border areas in the Northwest (戍边郡) during Qin and Han dynasties and replacing hereditary tribal chiefs by transferees appointed by the central government (改土归流) in the Southwest during Qing dynasty and the period of the Republic. But in 1980s, the government did the opposite – instead of encouraging continued internal migration, it recalled large numbers of Han settlers and cadres from minority areas. Such a policy as was adverse to the fundamental feature of the Chinese civilization has only served to further exacerbate ethnic tension.

In a word, the inner logic of development of Chinese civilization is different from that of Western nation-states. According to the former, the large-scale internal migration promoted by the Chinese government was “politically correct”, though alleged to be “violation of human rights” by Westerners. The development of human civilizations has assumed different patterns. We cannot yet conclude that the Western one is the best, because the separation into nation-states has already brought about so many wars and sufferings to the world. In contrast, through free internal migrations and free transracial marriages in the past thousands of years, Chinese civilization has not only assimilated Caucasians living in Xinjiang, but integrated the religiously tenacious Jews as well, who both have been living peacefully together with other peoples on the East Asian continent till the present day.

It is only natural to believe that the Chinese, with their great acculturating power, will not only further integrate the minority nationalities in Xinjiang and Tibet, but also assimilate immigrants from Japan and the United States. The Chinese civilization continuing to grow naturally as an integrated whole will inevitably help remold the world into a stateless one, that is, one without division into bounded nation-states. May that day come sooner!