Wu-Wei in Europe: A Study of Eurasian Economic Thought

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By Christian Gerlach
2008-07-31 02:44:24

(The author is with Department of Economic History, London School of Economics.)

EDITOR’S NOTE:
This thesis presents very valuable historical data on the communication between Chinese and Western cultures in the past. It also provides new impetus for a continuation of such communications at the present time when the humanity is facing new problems and looking for new solutions.

To avoid misunderstanding of the different traditional Chinese schools of thought, it is necessary to mention the following:

1. The Taoist concept of “wu-wei” is not quite the same as the European “lassez-faire”. From the context of Taoist literature it is obvious that wu-wei means “not acting from personal motives or prejudices”, not ”not doing anything”. The Taoists advocated going along with the Tao of guiding changes towards a balance between Yin and Yang, which represents intra- and inter-relationships within and between all things in existence.

2. The Taoist-Legalist school encouraged commerce on the one side and on the other worked to keep a dynamic balance between the interests of the merchants and those of the peasants; whereas Confucianists discouraged commerce on the one side and on the other opposed dynamically balancing the interests of different social groups.

ABSTRACT
This present paper focuses on the diffusion of wu-wei (an ancient Chinese concept of political economy) throughout Europe, between 1648 and 1848. It argues that at the core of this diffusion process were three major developments; firstly the importation and active transmission of wuwei by the Low Countries, during the seventeenth century. It is revealed
that the details of Chinese expertise entered Europe via the textual diffusion of Jesuit texts and the visual diffusion of million of so-called minben-images, during the ceramic boom of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thus, the hypothesis is advanced that the diffusion of wu-wei, co-evolved with the inner-European laissez-faire principle, the
Libaniusian model.

In the second part it is shown that the intellectual foundation of Europe’s first economic school, Physiocracy, is a direct replica of the imported Chinese economic, agrarian craftsmanship of wu-wei; subsequently it is denied that the indigenous European Libaniusian ideology can be considered the intellectual master-model of Physiocracy and his founder Quesnay.

Thirdly, it is argued that Switzerland can be identified as the first European paradigm state of wu-wei. The crystallization process of wu-wei inside Europe ultimately ended with the economic-political reorganization of the new Eidgenossenschaft in 1848, in which Chinese agrarian wu-wei was institutionally combined with the traditional Swiss “commercial wuwei”. In due course, this alpine paradigm enabled the endogenous Libaniusian model to verify and reflect upon its own theory of commercial
society. Additionally, this third focus also demonstrates that the later development of Europe’s laissez-faire doctrine has to be seen as a Eurasian co-production – without wu-wei, Europe’s pro-commercial ideology might never have matured.

TEXT

Introduction

Which is the more believable of the two, Moses or China? Blaise Pascal (*1623–?1662), French philosopher1 This essay will explore the impact of inter-Eurasian webs of interconnections on Europe’s political economy from 1648 to 1848. I will start with the assumption that there has never been an autonomous civilization in history, which proved capable of providing continuous development inside a framework of political or economical autarchy. Furthermore, I claim that to assure an extensive, successful era of peace and prosperity, civilizations have to draw on ‘useful knowledge’ from other centres of civilization. In nature, as in history, there can be no knowledge without contact – human knowledge is continuously reborn by the forces of contact, ever changing, evolving towards ever more complexity.2 I will try to spell out a vision of global history that is based on investigating the European effects of such Eurasian exchanges of complexity. In 1991, the historian W. H. McNeill stressed, “the principal factor promoting historically significant social change is contact with strangers possessing new and unfamiliar skills.”3 My focus is therefore on the diffusion of such a ‘new and unfamiliar skill’, to be precise, on a particular skill of Chinese state craftsmanship. This Eastern expertise in `good government′ is best described as wu-wei, a rough approximation of what is a complex concept of Chinese political economy, governance and religion, originating from a period before the Han Dynasty. It is best translated, as action by nonaction or doing nothing, yet there is nothing that is not done. What exactly does this mean?

The Chinese character 無is literally translated as no or without, the character 為as doing or action. However, the axiom 無為translates not into complete absence of activity or doing nothing, but what it does mean is lesser activity, or doing less. The Huai Nan Tzu, an influential treatise on political philosophy from the early Western Han Dynasty (206 B.C.– 9
A.D.) defined 無為as follows:

“What is meant […] by wu-wei is that no personal prejudice [private or public will,] interferes with the universal Tao [the laws of things], and that no desires and obsessions lead the true course […] astray. Reason must guide action in order that power may be exercised according to the intrinsic properties and natural trends of things.”4

Thus, by relying on無為the state does less, yet everything is accomplished in accordance to the needs of the state. The philosophical core of this later political concept was formulated during the Shang Dynasty (~1500– ~1050 B.C.), as Slingerland’s recent book Effortless Action confirmed.5 Yet wu-wei only became a central component of classical Chinese political theory one thousands years later – as the political unit of China turned into the wu-wei Empire. Roger Ames’s comments on the Huai Nan Tzu6 illustrated how the doctrine of doing less developed into a political modus operandi, after the
chaotic Warring States period (475– 221 B.C.) of the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (771– 221 B.C.).7 During the eclectic Han period, ‘action by nonaction’ was firstly adapted as a political instrument to rule over the Empire in a peaceful and harmonious way. The result was that wu-wei was quintessentially transformed into a policy of wu-wei erzhi (literally: ‘order and equilibrium will be achieved without ruler’s intervention’).8 Thus, the principle wu-wei became the “[…] appropriate description of the ideal Confucian ruler: one who reigns but does not rule”.9 To understand in which specific political context the principle of ‘doing nothing, yet there is nothing that is not done’ was adapted; we have to raise the following points. Drawing partly on Ames and Hall’s work on the ancient Confucian philosopher Mencius’s egalitarian ideology minben (meaning: the ‘people/ peasantry as the foundation’)10 and Broadbent’s work on China’s utilitarian nongben (meaning: Chinese agricultural fundamentalism)11, Kent Deng revealed that the ideology of minben (i.e. the ‘mandate of heaven’ rooted in the people) had been an integral part of the post-‘Warring States’ implementation process of wuweierzhi.12 Furthermore, as Deng demonstrated, it is possible to identify a prosperous nongben–minben paradigm, based on wu-wei erzhi throughout the Tang Dynasty (618– 906 A.D.), one of China’s most prosperous and glorious periods.13 Thus, wu-wei has to be recognized as
a laissez-faire instrument of Chinese political economy whose rationale was to serve China’s agricultural economy, i.e. to assure the welfare of minben. Indeed, China’s system of nongben did ‘marginalise’ the interfering state and hence relied on wu-wei erzhi for assuring its economic prosperity.

The overall objective of this paper is thus to deal with the historical process of wu-wei’s diffusion inside Europe. The process lasted for approximately two hundred years (from 1648 to 1848) and has to be seen as the assimilation of an advanced concept of Eastern economical governance that ultimately transformed Europe’s economies and the political outlook of the modern political unit to a considerably extent. To trace back the European history of wu-wei I am going to focus on three
geographical areas that proved essential in transforming pieces of Eastern knowledge into European practice: the Low Countries, France, and Switzerland.

If the amount of literature on the history of wu-wei inside China is to be considered sparse, serious research on wu-wei inside Europe can be considered even sparser. Nevertheless, let us turn now to the literature on wu-wei, concerning our three geographical areas of interest, and to the issue, how this essay may add to the current research; first, we will look at the Low Countries. During the 17th century, millions of Chinese art products were diffused all over Europe by the Low Countries; and as the studies by Christiaan Jorg14 and Julia Curtis15 have repeatedly stated this import-boom of Chinese images and products was crucial for Europe’s understanding of China. Both authors made clear, that the diffusion of Chinese artefacts and styles inside the Low Countries reached such a level of sophistication during the 17th century, that one is hardly able to
compare it to the widespread intellectual hollowness of the later Chinoiserie craze throughout Europe. Only some authors have dealt with Chinese influence on the Low Countries beyond the world of ceramics. Lewis A. Maverick’s ‘A possible Chinese source of Spinoza’s doctrine’16 inspired by the original research by Ch’ên Shou-yi17 was one of the first studies to stress the closeness between Confucianism and European philosophy, during the 17th century. Yet, there exists no detailed study on
how wu-wei entered the Low Countries during the 17th century; this paper seeks to correct this.

Almost all the literature on wu-wei in France concentrates on Fran?ois Quesnay’s role, while the broader Eurasian network of the Physiocratic School is mainly neglected. During the late 1930s, Ly Siou Y and Edgar Schorer were the first to deal with possible influence of wu-wei on Physiocracy.18 The first text, which convincingly portrayed Quesnay’s Sinophilsm, is Maverick’s ‘China – A model for Europe’19 but it was only with a paper by Briger Priddat that a detailed evaluation of the wu-wei
behind France’s Physiocracy arrived, in 1984.20 Priddat, relying on Schwarz’s translation of wu-wei, “to let it grow”21, concluded that the system of Physiocracy indeed corresponds to the principle of ‘tun/ ohne/ tun’ i.e. wu-wei.22 Thus, Physiocracy’s claim “[…] that free trade wouldlead to a natural distribution of [agricultural] produce […]”23 is directly linked to Quesnay’s belief in the universal morality of agri-culture (i.e. nongben). The productive branches of industry and trade (the Industrie,- und Handelszweige), writes Priddat, form only minor parts of the all embracing ordre naturel which Quesnay imagined as a tree, which he called économie. For Physiocracy, ‘good government’ is therefore based on ‘letting the branches grow’ (s’étendre en liberté)24 i.e. Practising wuweierzhi. Consequently, it is this variant of the laissez-faire maxim in which the basis of Physiocracy’s ‘moral philosophy’ is to be located.Priddat’s work made clear that the wu-wei of the complete économie has to be considered central to Physiocracy; Quesnay’s call for free trade in agricultural products constitutes merely a logical sub branch of this greater structure. 25

New research by Clarke and Hobson on wu-wei in France, equally re-acknowledges the significance of the principles for Quesnay’s theories.26 However, both authors fail to explain what the diffusion of wuwei actually means for European history. Simply to state, that wu-wei translates into French as laissez-faire, does not clarify the stages of wuwei’s transformation process inside Europe.27 Both authors fail additionally to locate Switzerland as the supreme centre of wu-wei in Europe, after Quesnay. Thus, the third part of this paper tries to investigate how the wu-wei of the Physiocrats spread to Switzerland and ultimately produced the first wu-wei paradigm state inside Europe. No study has linked the Chinese principle of wu-wei to Switzerland’s specific type of agricultural-alpinecommercial economy. The development of European Physiocracy is generally believed to have stopped soon after Quesnay’s death; I argue otherwise. This paper will try to analyse how the import of wu-wei did actually re-enforce the political-economical consolidation process of 19th Switzerland, and how wu-wei came to be at the centre of the ‘new Eidgenossenschaft’s’ political economy.

I. Wu-wei in the Low Countries

Keeping the lack of comprehensive sources in mind, it will nevertheless be interesting to analyze in which ways the introduction of Chinese art products (picturing idyllic scenes of a prosperous Empire) and the parallel occurrence of Sinophile texts (published in Amsterdam and partly written by Flemish Jesuits), transformed the intellectual outlook of Europe. Contemporary authors, who emphasize the indigenous development of economic laissez-faire in Europe, do repeatedly emphasize the significance of the Dutch natural law thinker Hugo de Grotius (*1583- ?1645).28 It is commonly understood that Grotius matters greatly for the development of 18th century Liberalism because he greatly influenced Francis Hutcheson, one of Adam Smith’s most important teachers.29 This chapter seeks to juxtapose the beginning infiltration of wu-wei into Europe with Grotius’s impact on the European mind, after the period of religious wars of the 17th century. In what way did the Low
Countries diffuse wu-wei throughout Europe, while Grotius’s legacy continued to mature?

1.1 The textual diffusion

Translations of Grotius’s magnus opus De jure belli et pacis (1625), a book which had passed almost unnoticed in the year of its first publication, kept constantly reappearing throughout the century. Grotius work on the unwritten but imperative Law of God that governs also in times of war, the Natural Law, resurfaced widely in the minds of a generation which stood in awe before the terror and bloodshed of the Thirty-Years-War.30 However, the re-emerging of Grotius texts during the second half of the 17th century also meant the continuation of the so-called northern European revival of Libanius.31 Libanius, a Roman pagan teacher, had eulogized the great virtues of free commerce and peaceful cooperation between men during the fourth-century BC. Grotius and others tried to find ways to resurrect Libanius’s ancient ‘universal economy’, after 1648.32 The liberal, urban environment of 17th century Amsterdam was ideal for harbouring this neo-Libaniusian movement. Yet, it was exactly in this European city that the pieces of information, which would later be used to decode the ‘universal economy’ doctrine of the
East, were first to be welcomed.

The Low Countries or more precisely the Chinezen van Amsterdam (to paraphrase van Winter)33 proved essential for wu-wei in Europe in two ways. First, they acted as the main diffusion base for the important Jesuit texts on China’s political economy. Resulting from an influx of missionaryreports from China, a mass of publications emerged, dealing with the economy, politics and history of the Chinese Empire. Secondly, parallel to this growing textual supply, thousands of images on porcelain, picturing mainly well-fed Chinese living happily inside a ‘wu-wei Empire’, started to flood the Low Countries, as well. Jesuit books constitute a strong variant of this Eastern current inside the Low Countries: Martino Martini (*1614-?1661) published his “Histoire de la guerre des Tatares contre la Chine” in the Catholic Flemish stronghold of Douai, 1654; Gonzalez de Mendosa’s “Rerum morumque in regno Chinensi maxime notabilium historia” appeared in Antwerp one year later. Especially two publications proved very influential (both, like Grotius first published in Amsterdam): the first scientific atlas of China, compiled by Martino Martini in 1655 (see image 1), and Athanasius Kircher’s China monumentis: qua sacris qua
profanis (…) illustrata published in 1667.34 These two publications from Amsterdam showed in detail the territorial magnificence and economic wealth of the Empire, influencing Leibniz, Quesnay and others, in the years to come.35

Apart from printing works by German (like Kircher) or Austrian (like Martini) Jesuits that revealed China’s high level of prosperity, the Low Countries were also the origin of many China missionaries, like Nicolas Trigault (*1577-?1628) or Ferdinand Verbiest (*1623- ?1688).36 Just as the Jesuit Matteo Ricci (*1552- ?1610) introduced Euclid to Ming China, so Trigault introduced Europe to Confucius via his Histoire de l’expédition christiene au royaume de la Chine.37 Early in 1615, he wrote:38 “We [the Jesuit missionaries] have seen [China’s] most noble provinces; we enter every day into conversation with the principle citizens, the magistrates and the men of letters; we speak the native language of the Chinese; we have learned by careful enquiry, their habits, customs, laws and ceremonial and, finally (what is of the greatest importance), day and night we have their books in our hands.”39

The economic Sinophilsm of the important Physiocrat Quesnay, with all its consequences, seems unlikely to have blossomed without another prominent work on China by Père du Halde, the Description de l’empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise (1735), but du Halde’s work appears equally implausible without the groundbreaking Amsterdam texts or Trigault’s translation of Ricci.40 Thus, Amsterdam, Antwerp and Douai,through commercial power, respectively Jesuit passion, proved essential for the European version of economic government by wu-wei that was soon to emergence. China, and therefore wu-wei, entered Europe not through Portugal or France but via the Low Countries. John M. Headley describes the outcome:

“The most notable single appropriation of Confucianism by the Enlightenment comes with the Amsterdam 1758 edition of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Philosophers. There amidst the traditional thinkers of classical antiquity could now be found a
ninety-page exposition of Confucius and Confucianism”41

1.2 The visual diffusion

Yet, there is an additional Chinese influence on Europe via the Low Countries, and this was not by textual but by visual means. Two factors had been curial for facilitating the diffusion of wu-wei in Europe, the extensive ‘global reach’ of Dutch international sea-power and the emerging of a powerful, domestic ceramic industry – the interplay of these two dynamics powered the diffusion process.42 While Amsterdam was at the commercial and logistic heart of Europe’s largest merchant fleet with some 10,000 vessels, one of Europe’s earliest centres of ceramic industry was slowly encircling her city walls.

Dutch East India ships had swamped first the Low Countries and then the rest of Europe, with “more than three million pieces of Chinese porcelain […] between 1602 and 1657 […]”.43 The origin of the celebrated blue and white painted fa?ence of Delft can be traced back to this massive influx of Chinese porcelain. By 1650, ten pottery workshops had opened at Grotius’s birthplace alone – there would be thirty in 1670.44 The makers of Delft’s fa?ence copied various Chinese images displaying picturesque and joyful scenes of minben (see image 2). By 1700, millions of pieces of fa?ence, depicting the comfort and welfare of the wu-wei Empire, had diffused throughout Europe.45

To demonstrate the importance of this non-textual diffusion, we can refer to the later case of Jean Theodore Royer (*1737- ?1807). Royer was a successful lawyer from The Hague and the most important Sinologist in the Low Countries of the 18th century. He thought that the best way of develop a true understanding about the prosperous life in China was actually to collect ceramics and other objects depicting information from China. Royer believed in this hypothesis all his life, deeply mistrusting European publication on China.46

Minben-porcelain and neo-Libaniusian texts did attain their closest proximity in Amsterdam.47 For a short period, this urban entrep?t nurtured Grotius, Chinese porcelain and the bookish merchandise of Jesuit missionary zeal.48 But in contrast to later France, where the Physiocrats would transform the dispersed pieces of Eurasian economic thought into one grande Eurasian theory of good government (without having the pleasure to see it transformed into real governmental practice), the Low
Countries proved unable to articulate the first European transformation of the wu-wei principle. The Low Countries functioned only as a gateway for wu-wei, diffusing it unconsciously throughout Europe. The most likely reason for this ‘failure’ was that the intellectual heritage of the Habsburg- Netherlands (modern Belgium) within the Northern United Provinces substantially diminished as the century progressed. Catholics became virtually second-class citizens in Amsterdam and although a rest of Jesuit-Chinese knowledge did survive within the Protestant Republic, this bit was ignored for decades.49

In sum, it is critical to understand that the spread of new useful knowledge from China and the artistic images of its prosperous economic effects occurred in chorus with the formation and deepening of Europe’s own Libaniusian model. Amsterdam kept on publicizing Grotius’s call for the freedom of commerce, while the Jesuit reports on the economic glory
of some 120 million Chinese became more and more popular.50 The enormous scale of imported Chinese artefacts facilitated the diffusion process of the endogenous Chinese model, via confirming, through its visual demonstration effect, the prosperous outcomes of wu-wei. Consequently, the two strings of laissez faire-thought, the indigenous Libaniusian model and the endogenous Chinese model, share a common geographical and cultural foundation (best symbolized by image 3). Both evolved simultaneously, yet separately, from the Low Countries, after 1648.51 Thus, this small part of northern Europe was responsible for setting the diffusion process of the incoming Chinese resource portfolio into motion. Over time, this process became partly intermingled with themindigenous Libaniusian model, but before this could happen, France had to discover wu-wei first.52

II. Wu-wei in France 1750- 1850

The physician and economist Fran?ois Quesnay (*1694-?1774) is generally seen as the founder of 18th century Europe’s “new science of Political Economy”53 but his contemporaries knew him as the Confucius of Europe. As Fox-Genovese writes:

“ [Quesnay’s] manuscript for ‘Le despotisme de la Chine’ contains a few pages on the life of Confucius which were deleted from the published version […] Indeed, the title given him by his disciples – ‘The Confucius of Europe’ – originated […] in his own self-image.”54

Both characterizations are essential to appreciate Quesnay’s role in the history of wu-wei in Europe but unfortunately, “what is often omitted in accounts of Quesnay’s place in modern thought is his debt to China”55 in general and to wu-wei in particular.

2.1 A Eurasian Quesnay

Indeed, stressing the impact of Quesnay’s Sinophilism on his economic theories has encountered strong scepticism by various scholars who like to limit Quesnay’s intellectual origins exclusively to Europe. One part of the critics does almost categorically ignore or neglect Chinese influence on Quesnay.56 One of the most distinguished historians on the history of laissez-faire, Jacob Viner, restricted the antecedents of Europe’s laissez-faire doctrine to four indigenous traditions: Greco- Roman, Scholastic, English common law, and mercantilist thought.57 Another group of critics admits the existence of Quesnay’s Sinophilism but continues to overweight indigenous European explanations for the evolvement of a philosophy of free trade after 1776.58 The key writings that do underline Quesnay’s considerable debt to Chinese thought were mainly (and strangely) all published before 1950.59 Nevertheless, Davis60 and Clarke61 have recently tried to revive the reinterpretation of Quesnay’s work as an example of the historical process of intellectual Eurasian synthesis – without understating the traces of indigenous Western philosophy in it.62 Especially, John M. Hobson (like Maverick and other ‘Eurasians’ before him) newly reinforced the historical argument for a truly Eurasian perspective on Quesnay’s economic philosophy.63 Not only did Quesnay approve of China but also, writes Maverick, was directly inspired by her, copying important sections from her classics.64 The foundational theoretical assertion of Physiocracy, namely that a society which is organized on nature’s own way of functioning (i.e.Agri-culture) is the most prosperous, strongest and happiest, matches Confucianism’s claim that it can only be the achievement of agricultural prosperity by which the state and people can obtain “peace and harmony”.65 Quesnay’s preference for Chinese classics over European ones shows most clearly, when he compares the most influential text in East Asian intellectual history, Confucius’s Lun Yü (Analects) with the quality of Greek knowledge:66

“[The articles of Lun Yü] all deal with good government, virtue and good works; this collection is full of principles and moral sentences, which surpass those of the Seven Sages of Greece.”67 It is therefore accurate to describe Quesnay a faithful discipline of Confucius and an understatement to classify his work simply as “quite favourable towards China”68, as McCormick did.69 Quesnay’s vision of a political rule, which is based on the prosperity achieved via primary production i.e., nongben, is deeply embedded in a ‘Confucian vision of good government’.70 However, this nongben-model of Quesnay is
adapted using China’s wu-wei framework. As Hudson explains:

“For [Quesnay], enlightenment in a ruler consisted in recognizing the principles of the ‘natural order’ and making legislation conform thereto. When the king has reformed legislation he should then ‘do nothing, but let the laws rule’; this is the wu-wei of the Chinese ideal monarch. [For Quesnay], efforts of government to control trade […] do not create wealth […]; they are violations of the ‘natural order’.”71

Consequently, Quesnay’s model of Physiocracy is primarily based on his implementation of wu-wei erzhi. Quesnay’s Eurasian make-up is crucial for the history of wu-wei in Europe because, as McCormick accentuated, “Quesnay had a direct influence on [Adam] Smith”72. However, what were Quesnay’s sources on the wu-wei Empire? Which part did he play inside Europe’s network of Asian relations?

2.2 inside the Eurasian web

As an 18th century man who lived in the China of Europe73, Quesnay was not only influenced by the old strings of inherited Stoicism and Descartes, like his fellow citizen, the radical anti-Colbertiste Pierre Le Pesant, Sieur de Boisguilbert (*1646-?1714) had been.74 The founder of Physiocracy tried to show that the pieces of economic philosophy he received from the East were in fact more advanced compared to the ones of western Eurasia – the end result was a fusion of the two worlds of thought, the first step towards one grand design of Eurasian political economy. But how did the altering form of Chinese thought reach the mind of Quesnay?

There were of course several ‘European reasons’ why Quesnay ended up with his specific type of economic system based on ‘Natural Order i.e. Law’ (Deism and the aftershock of the religious War of the 17thcentury were two important factors). Nevertheless, Quesnay’s new and challenging physiocratic mosaic is best to be seen as the zenith of the century old European movement of deep admiration for China. 75 The French physician’s economic undertaking was at its heart truly Chinese.
As his disciple, Marquis Victor de Mirabeau (*1717-?1789) described his teacher after his death:

“[He was dedicated to] the whole teaching of Confucius […] aimed at restoring to human nature that first radiance, that first beauty, which it had received from Heaven, and which had become obscured by ignorance and passion. [Quesnay], therefore, exhorted his countrymen to obey the Lord of Heaven, to honour and fear him […]”76

Thus, the Lord of Heaven, for Quesnay, was most apparent in the harmonious order of the Chinese Empire, the wu-wei Empire. Quesnay’s writings were part of an anti-mercantilist movement inside 18th century France. The French Jesuits’s publications on China provided this widespread protest movement with a completely new intellectual outlook. The texts by the Jesuits demonstrated to Quesnay the contemporary relevance of wu-wei – a significance, he thought, that the European classics were unable to offer. The Chinese example produced eventually an altered forward motion of the French mind77 – away from the interventionist mercantilism of Europe and towards a Chinese ordre naturel.

There were two publications, which did much to deepen Quesnay’s physiocratic Sinophilsm in his later life, Jacques Philibert Rousselot de Surgy’s “Mélanges intéressans et curieux…”78 (1764- 66)79 and a work by Pierre Poivre. Quesnay directly copied large parts of the “Mélanges intéressans…” into his “Le despotisme…” (1767), composing the most lucid work of the Physiocratic school (which was at the same time its most Sinophile).80 Like the 17th-century fa?ence-workshops of Delft (see above) adapted the prosperous images of Chinese minben as their own, 18thcentury Quesnay adapted China’s nongben. However, how did de Surgy’s text change Quesnay’s intellectual outlook? The background to why Quesnay and de Surgy proved so receptive to the information coming from the Eurasian maritime web was the urgent need of economic and political reform in France. To attack the Republican views of Montesquieuian Liberals (who praised parliamentarianism and despised the French Monarchy), neo-monarchist like de Surgy (who praised the reformist potential of enlightened despotism) relied heavily on
China as a model.81 De Surgy tried to show objectively that commercial success was achievable and even enhanced, by modelling one’s government on the contemporary achievements of China’s “enlightened monarchy”. At the heart of this enlightened approach, was the abolishment of all mercantilism’s restrictions on commerce, and further the implementation of wu-wei i.e. The institutionalization of the ‘Natural Order’. Describing the “richesses immenses”82 of Asia, de Surgy linked economic success to this form of natural government i.e. Wu-wei. Quesnay copied the first seven chapters of “Le despotisme…” nearly entirely from de Surgy’s text.83 Moreover, in accordance with de Surgy, Quesnay identified his crucial economic concept of ordre naturel as underlying every civilized state. It is then here where Quesnay’s position shifts towards the original economic notion of Han China and drifts away from old European conceptions of ‘Natural Order’ as a force undermining the foundations of civilisation.84 Surgy’s text enables Quesnay to go beyond the Stoic and parts of medieval thinking, arriving at a very Chinese arrangement of ‘good government’, embracing the lessons of the Lun Yü.85

The other major influence on Quesnay’s work was the retired French ambassador to China and president of the Royal Society of Agriculture at Lyons, Pierre Poivre. In 1763 and 1764, Poivre gave two lectures on agriculture to the French Academy of Lyons; they were later to be repeated in Paris and published in Switzerland in 1768.86 In Lyon, Poivre lectured on what the world might become, namely an image of flourishing China, if only the laws of China would become the laws of the world. Poivre called upon all Frenchmen to go to Beijing, to gaze at the perfect image of Heaven.87 Quesnay became aware of these axioms
through copies of the lectures and his acquaintance to another Sinophile, Anne Robert-Jacques Turgot (*1727- ?1781).88 Poivre’s reflections on agriculture were in essence a tribute to the Chinese superior form of virtuous economic management and government:

“This great nation unites under the shade of agriculture, founded on liberty and reason, all the advantages possessed by whatever nation, civilized or savage.”89

Poivre’s interpretation convinced Quesnay once more of China’s supreme model of ‘natural government’ – once again the wu-wei erzhi of ‘enlightened despotism’ offered itself to be the magic but subversive (i.e. Anti-mercantilist) key to open France’s door to economic, agricultural progress. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Quesnay decided to publish his Physiocratie (1767) in made up ‘Peking’, to avoid French censorship.90 In 1767, Quesnay’s mind was already more at home in the capital of the wu-wei Empire than in Louis XV’s Paris.

In 1774, the year of Quesnay’s death, the governmental concept of wu-wei had reached a new level of prominence throughout the informed circles of Europe – in form of the physiocratic doctrine. Wu-wei had finally left the small scholarly chambers of the Jesuit- philosophes circles and started to infiltrate Europe ever more, while the images of prosperous minben continued to spread all over Europe.

III. Wu-wei in Switzerland

The Low Countries and France do not represent the complete European axis of wu-wei infiltration. Before the tolerant period of Eurasian synthesis inside Europe would cease to exist, terminated by the rise of national neo-mercantilist Revolutionism, a European mutation of the wuwei-state was erected inside a small Alpine transit-land, Switzerland. During the 17th century, the Low Countries had provided Europe with mass of new information on China but the “Chinezen van Europa”91 did prove unable to decipher the wu-weian message. Quesnay had based his model of reform on wu-wei – yet, Physiocracy’s influence on the political economy of post-revolutionary France was almost nonexistent. Ultimately, it was in the Swiss Confederation where the actual fusion of European, traditional practice and imported Chinese expertise, materialized. In this section we will consider two aspects of this fusion process, first, the effects of Quesnay’s theories on Switzerland, and secondly, Switzerland’s development into a European paradigm of wu-wei. The Swiss succeeded where France and the Low Countries failed; through their example, the European political unit transformed itself under the banner of China’s wuwei. But how did Switzerland do this?

3.1 The Fusion

After the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) by Louis XIV, 25,000 Huguenots exiles had settled and revived large parts of Switzerland, economically and culturally.92 From the seven Swiss contributors to the French Encyclopédie, only two were not second generation Huguenots.93 Additionally, the traditional inter-European intellectual endeavours of the Huguenots (the ‘livre de Hollande’)94 pulled Switzerland closer to the inner-circles of the so-called ‘Republic of Letters’, whose centre was Amsterdam.95 Thus, a matured enlightened nexus had arisen in western Switzerland and the independent republic of Geneva, by the 1720s.96 During the 1760s, a distinct Sinophile block of the so-called ‘école romande du droit naturel’ (Alfred Dufour)97 and Swiss Economic Patriots, started to reprint Quesnay’s sources on China, re-creating his personal resource pool on wu-wei in western Switzerland. In 1764, de Surgy’s vital texts were published at the ‘imprimerie de Fortunato Bartolomeo de Felice’98 in Yverdon.99 In the same year, the process continued through the posthumous publication of the Considérations by Marquis d’Argenson (*1694-?1757)100, a former classmate of the Sinophile Voltaire. The favourite maxim of the Marquis, Europe’s first ‘true free trader’101, had been ‘to govern better, one must govern less’102; which is of course analogous to the wu-wei principle of the ideal Confucian ruler, who reigns but does not rule.103 At the end of his life, d’Argenson had developed a deep sense of admiration for Chinese state craftsmanship. As he wrote in
Considérations:

“The Chinese government embodies the ‘juste milieu’, [here] the Law of Confucius still exists [...], although it is as old as that of Solon, [which is] destroyed, and even caused the destruction of […] Empires. I believe in exact the description which I have just made of the Chinese government […] I propose to the nations of Europe this model [of superior government], for their own benefits.”104

Interestingly, the first edition of the famous Lyon-lecture by Poivrewas published in Yverdon as well, only four years after de Surgy and d’Argenson.105

Besides replicating Quesnay’s sources on wu-wei, Yverdon was very active in diffusing various original physiocratic texts. Parallel to Poivre, a collection of Quesnay’s writings by the French Physiocrat Pierre du Pont de Nemours, the “Physiocratie, ou constitution naturelle du gouvernement”, was published.106 Once again, the strong influence of
French Sinophilsm on the Swiss enlightened nexus becomes apparent by quoting Nemours on the Chinese expertise in government:

“[China’s way of government], by taking human nature into account, includes all the needed […] laws for men, and is suitable for all types of climate and countries; since four thousands years [the ordre naturel] has remained the [official doctrine] of the Chinese government.“107

Unsurprisingly, the French Physiocrats had been attracted to parts of this very sinophile part of Switzerland – especially after the foundation of the partly physiocratic Economic Society of Bern, in 1759.108 From very early on, one of Quesnay’s students, the Sinophile Marquis Victor de Mirabeau became ecstatic about the French Physiocrats’s Swiss connection.109 In 1760, he travelled to Bern and addressed the society:

“Finally the day of days has dawned which will open the eyes of mankind to the best of her truest advantages, this is because the‘?konomische Gesellschaft’ is to be established in the capital of the most powerful canton of Switzerland […] Admirable citizens, soon all the dispersed pieces of knowledge will, under your favour, crystallize in your country and form a protected and secured treasure of knowledge. I cannot reveal to you what I am expecting, what I am hoping for in this deepest of moments. But do not despise the discoveries of the people who preceded you in this noble cause.”110

Indeed, one member of the society would not despise the findings of the French around the ‘Confucius of Europe’; this person was Albrecht von Haller (*1708-?1777), an influential physiologist and writer. As one of the outstanding Swiss intellectual figures of the 18th century, he chaired the Economic Society for nine years (1766, 1768, 1770-1777) and was fascinated by the works of the Sinophiles, Mirabeau and Christian Wolff.111 Haller frequently used his knowledge of the Chinese Empire to criticise anti-physiocratic writings. He condemned Galiani’s writings on the poor export power of agriculture, by drawing attention to the “entrepreneurialzation of the Chinese peasantry”112: “Galiani, the defender [of industry, is] mistaken: the tailor from Canton, he says, can work for Paris but not the [Cantonese] peasant. [Galiani forgets that] the Chinese peasant produces [the] silk for London [as well].”113

In 1771, Haller published Usong, a Swiss Staatsroman i.e. description of the ideal state in all its aspects, whose political philosophy was deeply influenced by the principle of wu-wei.114 Although Haller’s story plays in Persia, the lessons of his Staatsroman were the lessons he had personally drawn from examining the government of virtuous China.115 Haller’s ideal state is based on China’s universally applicable laws and a bureaucracy that is governed by the principle of accountability, but most importantly on the principle of ‘action by non-action’.116 Haller’s Emperor simply rests in a state of wu-wei as the human embodiment of the authority in which laws and bureaucracy are grounded, like the ideal Confucian ruler who reigns but does not rule.117 Furthermore, the tax system is copied from the Chinese practice.118 Like in China, the system is mainly based on land-poll, and indirect taxes play only a secondary role.119 One indirect tax is known, a very low import duty. However, this duty is fixed at the lowest rate possible because it is “not the Emperor’s wish to extort riches from the merchants”120 but to increase commerce and agriculture.121 Thus, the Emperor Usong is most concerned with agriculture as the base of the state i.e. the nongben-minben ideology, but also considers evenly commerce and industry as sources of national wealth.122 Usong’s physiocratic government does not despise cities (as the Physiocrats did) but aims to protect the welfare of the urban centers to assure additional welfare for the people of the Empire.123

Therefore, by choosing China as his preferred model of government, Haller ends up praising wu-wei as a virtuous and successful instrument of government. However, most importantly, the commercial power of the city is added to Haller’s vision of the ideal state. Unlike Quesnay, who was very much focused on copying the nongben qualities of China, the economic model by Haller endorses the modern commercialism of the urban centres as a vital element for a wu-wei state in Europe. Haller states clearly that this de-linking of wu-wei erzhi from its agricultural core is done for the benefit of the whole population, including
the peasants (hence minben).124

Thus, Haller urged Switzerland to transform the French-Chinese physiocratic message of wu-wei for the solely benefit of ‘the people’. He attached the component of urban freedom to the original principle, which had solely been based on the Chinese virtue of agrocracy (agriculture and peasantry-friendly)125. This inclusion of commercial wu-wei was facilitated by Switzerland’s high proto-industrialization and free trade tradition. Quesnay’s one-to-one copy of the Chinese principle had been ideally suited to reform the autocratic, agrarian, anti-commercial ‘China in Europe’126 but for agrarian and commercial Switzerland, this so-perfect model would work no more. The Swiss, not the French, nor the British, altered the authentic Chinese ‘agrarian wu-wei’ to suit their own needs, transforming themselves into the new European paradigm of wu-wei. This
additional economic freedom was embraced via Switzerland’s traditional free trade economy.

3.2 The Paradigm

There are two aspects to the Swiss paradigm; first, forces inside the Swiss domestic policy arena caused its formation. Secondly, the paradigm functioned as Europe’s prime example of successful economic management, during the 19th century. Both aspects undermine the Hobson’s Anglo-centric viewpoints on laissez-faire.127 Let us deal first with the paradigm as an instrument of Swiss state building. Soon, after Napoléonic rule, the Swiss cantons ultimately transformed themselves into a federal, republican version of Haller’s ideal patriarchal and monarchic Usong state. The emerging ‘new Eidgenossenschaft’ of the 19th century, would prove to be strongly supportive of free trade, merchants and industry. Nevertheless, agrocracy (the nongben foundation of Haller’s model) had to be first identified as the most virtuous foundation of the ‘old Eidgenossenschaft’, to be additionally embraced by the ‘founding elite of 1848’.128 In other words, the post 1800 affirmation of the agrarian variant of wu-wei was politically generated to legitimise the new domination of commercial wu-wei. After the Civil War of the 1840s, an constitutional reform based on this ‘double embrace’ promised to be the best way to assure national unity and economic welfare, while easing the strong national strife between Catholics and Protestants, commercial Liberals and agricultural Conservatives.129 To preserve the historical myth of the free, democratic alpine peasant (i.e. Wilhelm Tell) as the founder of the Swiss nation, inside the ‘new Eidgenossenschaft’, it was absolutely necessary to eulogize Haller’s ideal of alpine agrarian wu-wei and therefore to legitimize the new government of the Swiss commercial elite.130

Secondly, this successful economic compromise of Switzerland produced widespread admiration throughout 19th century-Europe – while images of prosperous China were still being diffused (see image 6). The commercial wu-wei had resulted from the fact that Switzerland’s prosperity (i.e. the welfare of Swiss minben) had depended on the free flow of European commerce, for centuries.131 Haller’s general wu-wei framework of the ideal state included a re-affirmation of this Swiss laissez-faire commercial tradition. As one of Europe’s key economic gateways, a majority of the cantons’s economies had conditioned themselves to function in a continuous environment of free trade (like Bale), although pockets of protectionism continued to exist (like Bern), right up to the 19th century.132 The influential English free trader Richard Cobden was one of the first admirers of Switzerland’s strange blend of agricultural and industrial prosperity, of agrarian and commercial wu-wei.On the 6th June 1834, he wrote to his brother, from Geneva:

“The people of this country [Switzerland], are I believe the best governed and therefore the most prosperous and happy in the world. It is the only Government [,] which has not, one douanière in its pay, and yet, thanks to free trade, there is scarcely any branch of manufacturing industry which does not in one part or other of the country find a healthy occupation. The farmers are substantial. Here is a far more elevated character of husbandry life than I expected to see. Enormous farm-houses and barns; plenty of out-houses of every kind; and the horses and cows are superior to those of the English farmers.”133

Like the prominent German political economist Friedrich List, Cobden was amazed that the free-trading Swiss economy, unlike his native England, included substantial farming.134 Nonetheless, he was just as impressed by the Swiss partly urban manufacturing industry i.e. Haller’s commercial wu-wei. This type of admiration of the Swiss economy was typical for the 19th century-disciples of the Libaniusian model. In consequence, the paradigm of the Swiss wu-wei state helped to transform Europe into an altered image of the wu-wei Empire. At last, Confucius and Libanius would fuse into one great modern Eurasian
theory of political economy and the European diffusion of wu-wei had been completed.

Conclusion

To conclude, we will draw attention to the three major findings of this paper. Firstly, the analysis demonstrated that the Chinese principle of wu-wei was actually imported and primarily diffused by the commercial and Jesuit nexus of the Low Countries. Consequently, the details of China’s expertise entered Europe via the textual diffusion of the Jesuit texts and were visually supported by million of minben-images during the ceramic boom. Secondly, it has been shown that the intellectual foundation of the School of Physiocracy is a direct replica of the imported Chinese economic craftsmanship of agrarian wu-wei; consequently the European Libaniusian ideology cannot to be considered the intellectual master-model of Physiocracy. Thirdly, it has been made clear that Switzerland was the first European paradigm state of wu-wei. The European crystallization process of wu-wei ultimately ended with the Swiss state of 1848, in which Chinese agrarian wu-wei was institutionally fused with traditional Swiss commercial wu-wei. In due course, this alpine paradigm enabled the Libaniusian model to verify and reflect upon its own theory of a commercial society. In the following, we will touch on the broader implications of these three findings.

The fact that the Chinese principle of wu-wei was imported into Europe via the Low Countries proves clearly that research, which stresses the purely indigenous development of Europe’s laissez-faire doctrine, is mistaken. McCormick and others do focus too much on the non-Eurasian development of the European revival of the Libaniusian model and leave out the parallel emergence of the Chinese model. Only by re-focusing on the historical forces, which allowed both models to exist and mature simultaneously, can historians win a deeper understanding of the origins of laissez-faire in Europe. The Low Countries are a supreme example of the historical proximity of both models, and a great deal may be learned from a direct and more detailed juxtaposition of Grotius and the early characteristics of wu-wei’s importation; on this matter, I have only touched the historical surface. Furthermore, the Low Countries offered essentially two entry points for wu-wei’s diffusion into Europe: firstly, their printing presses and secondly, the import of ceramics. The groundbreaking textual base was truly enhanced by the visual wave of images that confirmed a China at the peak of her economic development. The sinophile triangle of Amsterdam, Antwerp and Douai, was perfectly suited to push the message of wu-wei into the wider European arena of diffusion. Yet it was also an environment that was perfectly conditioned to receive wu-wei in the first place. In sum, wu-wei in the Low Countries was the outcome of a Catholic-Protestant, Flemish- Dutch co-production. Without the Jesuit from Douai the printing presses
of Amsterdam would have remained quiet – so much for Max Weber. The second part’s re-affirmation of Physiocracy as a direct copy of Chinese expertise is not as novel to current research, as it may sound –Hudson and Clarke are only the two recent examples of this approach.

Yet, the assertion of Quesnay as the ‘Confucius of Europe’ remains controversial, until this very day. Repeatedly, textbooks on the history of economic thought have continued to re-instate Physiocracy’s debt to Europe’s indigenous Libaniusian model. In this Eurocentric model, the direct links between the ancient Stoics, Newton and Quesnay remain untouched by incoming Eurasian influences. Part two of this paper has tried to demonstrate that this linear model of European thought is erroneous. The relative qualities of Europe can only be located in her capacity to embrace, fuse and transform non-European information; it is incorrect to construct her history of economic thought around a nexus of mental autarchy and the example of the history of wu-wei in France verifies this claim. Quesnay has to be understood as a mind inside the Eurasian web of economic thought, his ordre naturel as a product of wuweian influence and his so-called Physiocracy as a copy of China’s
nongben-minben paradigm. It is only through this Eurasian assertion that one can appreciate the implications of Physiocracy’s Swiss connections.

Finally, Switzerland’s economic model of 1848 is not completely a one-to-one model of the wu-wei Empire, and of course, her commercial wu-wei is as much a product of the Libaniusian model as much it is reinforced by the European diffusion of wu-wei. Nevertheless, the first state inside Europe, which is actually deeply shaped by wu-wei, remains Switzerland – neither the British Empire of Adam Smith, nor Fran?ois Quesnay’s France. Albrecht von Haller’s Swiss vision of Usong can be considered the first work of a European mind, which dis-connected the original agrarian wu-wei doctrine of China from its agrocentric i.e. nongben base, and added something truly European, namely commercial wu-wei. This process of fusion led to the European paradigm of wu-wei, namely 19th century Switzerland – admired and renowned by the disciples of the Libaniusian model, Cobden and List. The ‘new Eidgenossenschaft’ of 1848, based on free trade, commerce and a peasant state ideology can therefore be seen as the ultimate apex of wu-wei in Europe. Thus, two hundred years after the end of the terror of the Thirty-Years-War, a mountainous part of western Eurasia had created a new vision of harmonious government for the welfare of its people – we now know that without the diffusion of wu-wei, this might never have happened.

NOTE:

1 Pensées, No. 822, in: Blaise Pascal, Oeuvres Complètes, ed. and with notes by Louis Lafuma (New York 1963).
2 Eric J. Chaisson, Cosmic Evolution: The Rise of Complexity in Nature (Cambridge, Mass. 2001).
3 William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West (Chicago 1963; 1991 printing), p. xvi.
4 As quoted in: John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation (Cambridge 2004), p. 190.
5 Edward G. Singerland’s, Effortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China (Oxford University Press 2003).
6 Roger T. Ames, The art of rulership: a study in ancient Chinese political thought (Honolulu 1983).
7 For a different approach on wu-wei of the Han Dynasty, see: Michael Loewe, The cosmological context of sovereignty in Han times (Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 65, Issue 02, June 2002, pp. 342- 349).
8 Gang (Kent) Deng, The premodern Chinese economy: structural equilibrium and capitalist sterility (London 1999), p. 258.
9 Ames, The Art of Rulership, p. 29.
10 David L. Hall/ Roger T. Ames, Thinking through Confucius (Albany 1987).
11 Kieran Broadbent, A Chinese/English dictionary of China's rural economy (Slough 1978), p. 104.
12 Deng, The premodern Chinese economy, pp. 90, 92, 258.
13 Ibid., p. 92.
14 Christiaan J. A. Jorg, Interaction in Ceramics: Oriental Porcelain & Delftware (Hong Kong Museum of Art and Urban Council, Hong Kong, 1984); Christiaan J. A. Jorg, Chinese Porcelain for the Dutch in the Seventeenth Century: Trading Networks and
Private Enterprise, in: The Porcelains of Jingdezhen. Colloquies on Art & Archaeology in Asia, no. 16, ed. Rosemary E. Scott (Percival David Foundation of Chinese Art, London, 1993), pp. 183-205.
15 Julia B. Curtis, Chinese Porcelains of the Seventeenth Century: Landscapes, Scholar's Motifs and Narratives (China Institute in America, New York, 1995).
16 Lewis A. Maverick, A possible Chinese source of Spinoza’s doctrine, in: Revue de littérature comparée, Vol. 19, No. 3, July-September, 1939, pp. 417- 428.
17 Ch’ên Shou-yi, Sino-European cultural contacts since the discovery of the sea route, in: Nankai social and economic quarterly, Vol. VIII, No. 1, April 1935.
18 Ly Siou Y, Les Grands courants de la pensée économique chinoise dans l’antiquité… et leur influence sur la formation de la doctrine physiocratique (Paris 1936); Edgar Schorer, L’influence de la Chine sur la genèse er le development de la doctrine physiocrate (Paris 1938).
19 Lewis Adams Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 2 Vols., (San Antonio, 1946).
20 Briger Priddat, Ist das “laisser-faire”-Prinzip ein Prinzip des Nicht-Handelns? über einen chinesischen Einfluss in Quesnay’s “Desp?tisme de la Chine“ auf das physiokratische Denken (Diskussionsschriften aus dem Institut für Finanzwissenschaft der Universit?t Hamburg, Nr. 16/ 1984).
21 Laudse, Daudesching, E. Schwarz (ed), (Munich 1980) p. 137.
22 Priddat, “Laisser-faire”-Prinzip, p. 31.
23 Douglas A. Irwin, Against the Tide – An Intellectual History of Free Trade (New Jersey 1996), p. 65.
24 Ibid., p. 31.
25 Ibid., pp. 31- 33.
26 John James Clarke, Oriental enlightenment: the encounter between Asian and Western thought (New York/ London 1997); John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation (Cambridge 2004).
27 Hobson, Eastern Origins, p. 196; Clarke, Oriental, p. 50.
28 Irwin, Against the Tide, p. 69.
29 Roger E. Backhouse, The Penguin History of Economics (London 2002), pp. 108-114.
30 e.g. in the writings of Jean Le Clerc, Samuel von Pufendorf or Giambattista Vico.
31 Irwin, Against the Tide, p. 16.
32 Paul Hazard, The European Mind – The Critical Years 1680–1715 (New York 1990 [Paris 1935]), p. 87.
33 P. J. van Winter, De Chinezen van Europa (Groningen 1965).
34 Arnold H. Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarin – The Jesuits at the Court of China (Berkeley 1942), pp. 246- 247.
35 Wolfgang Franke, China and the West (Oxford 1967), pp. 60-61.
36 John E. Wills, Some Dutch Sources on the Jesuit China Mission, 1662-1687, in: Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu, Vol. 54 (1985), pp. 267- 293.
37 John E. Wills, 1688 – A Global History (London 2001), pp. 128- 144.
38 Matteo Ricci/ Nicolas Trigault, Histoire de l’expédition christiene au royaume de la Chine (Latin version, Augsburg/ French version, Lyon 1615).
39 As quoted in: Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarin, p. 245.
40 Raymond Dawson, The Chinese Chameleon – An analysis of European conceptions of Chinese civilization (New York/ Toronto 1967), p. 54.
41 John M. Headley, The Universalizing Principle and Process: On the West’s Intrinsic Commitment to a Global Context, p. 312., in: Journal of World History, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 291-321.
42 Claudia Schnurmann, 'Wherever profit leads us, to every sea and shore . . .': the VOC, the WIC, and Dutch methods of globalization in the seventeenth century, p. 490, in: Renaissance Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 474- 493.
43 C.R. Boxer, The Dutch seaborne Empire, 1600-1800 (London 1965), p. 174.
44 Richard Robinson (ed.), Business History of the World – A Chronology (Westport 1993), p. 143.
45 Adolf Reichwein, China and Europe – Intellectual and Artistic Contacts in the Eighteenth Century (London 1925 [original: Berlin 1923]), pp. 28.
46 Jan van Campen, De Haagse jurist Jean Theodore Royer (1737-1807) en zijn verzameling Chinese voorwerpen / door Jan van Campen (Hilversum 2000).
47 It was in this European entrep?t where the first small tea shipments to Europearrived, in 1609. Dutch VOC servants in Batavia (modern Jakarta) may have been the first Europeans who drank Chinese tea for purely personal pleasure and therefore
started Europe’s relationship with tea by stimulating the shipments to Amsterdam. (Ross William Jamieson, The Essence of Commodification: Caffeine Dependencies in the Early Modern World, p. 283 in: Journal of Social History – Vol. 35, No. 2, Winter 2001, pp. 269-294.)
48 J. I. Israel, European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism, 1550-1750 (London 1985); V. Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century (Baltimore 1963).
49 In 1773, Pope Clement XIV started to suppress systematically the Society of Jesus. Nevertheless, some former Dutch members of the Society managed to stay at de Krijtberg and other Northern Dutch towns, until the restoration of the Society in 1814.
The property of the Southern Dutch Jesuits was confiscated instead. Overall, the effect of Pope Clement’s policies was a transfer of Southern Jesuit knowledge to the United Provinces, during the 1770s. [J. Crétineau-Joly, Clément XIV et les jésuites (Paris 1847).]
50 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York/ London 2nd ed. 1999), p. 7.
51 Reichwein, China and Europe, pp. 19- 72.
52 Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarin, pp. 350, 352, 360.
53 Philippe Steiner, La "science nouvelle" de l'économie politique (Paris 1998).
54 E. Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy (Ithaca 1976), p.74.
55 Clarke, Oriental enlightenment, p.49.
56 Recent examples include: H. Spencer Banzhaf, Productive Nature and the Net Product: Quesnay's Economies Animal and Political, in: History of Political Economy, Vol. 32, No. 3, Fall 2000, pp. 517-551; Irwin, Against the Tide, pp. 64- 74; Eric Roll, A History of Economic Thought (London 19925) pp. 111-120; Walter Eltis, How Quesnay's Tableau économique Offered a Deeper Analysis of the Predicament of France, Journal of the History of Economic Thought, March 2002, Vol. 24 Issue 1, pp.
39-53.
57 Jacob Viner, Essays on the Intellectual History of Economics, [compiled and edited by Douglas A. Irwin], (Princeton/ Oxford 1991), pp. 24- 25.
58 Ken McCormick, Sima Qian and Adam Smith, in: Pacific Economic Review, 4: 1, 1999, pp. 85-87.
59 Reichwein, China and Europe, pp. 101-109; G.F. Hudson, Europe and China: A Survey of Their Relations from the Earliest Times to 1800 (London 1931) pp. 322- 25; Virgile Pinot, La Chine et la formation de l’esprit philosophique en France, 1640-1740 (Paris 1932); Maverick, China; Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarin, pp. 285-286.
60 Walter W. Davis, China, the Confucian Ideal, and the European Age of Enlightenment, pp. 539-540 in: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec., 1983) pp. 523-548; Walter W. Davis, Eastern and Western History, Thought, and
Culture, 1600-1815 (Lanham 1993).
61 John James Clarke, Oriental enlightenment: the encounter between Asian and Western thought (New York/ London 1997).
62 Although one can see influences in the work of the Australian historian Robertson: Robbie Robertson, The Tree Waves of globalisation. A history of a Developing global Consciousness (London/ New York 2003), p. 96.
63 Hobson, Eastern Origins, pp.196-198.
64 Maverick, China, p. 22
65 Huan-chang Ch'ên, The Economic Principles of Confucius and his School (New York 1911), p. 381
66 Consequently Quesnay follows Leibniz’s footsteps.
67 As quoted in: Reichwein, China and Europe, p. 105.
68 Ken McCormick, Sima Qian and Adam Smith, in: Pacific Economic Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1999, p. 85.
69 See also his paper on the non-existing link between Adam Smith and wu-wei: Ken McCormick, The Tao of Laissez-Faire, in: Eastern Economic Journal, Vol. 25, No. 3, Summer 1999, pp. 331- 341.
70 Quesnay, Despotism in China, pp. 207-211, in: Maverick, China.
71 Hudson, Europe and China, p. 322
72 McCormick, Sima Qian and Adam Smith, p. 85.
73 After 1750, people started to call France frequently the China of Europe. (Charles A. Fisher, Containing China? I. The Antecedents of Containment, p. 549 in: The Geographical Journal, Vol. 136, No. 4., Dec., 1970, pp. 534-556)
74 Paul P. Christensen, Epicurean and Stoic Sources for Boisguilbert's Physiological and Hippocratic Vision of Nature and Economics, in: History of Political Economy, Vol.35, Annual Supplement, 2003, pp. 101-128; Douglas A. Irwin, Against the Tide (Princeton 1996) p. 65.
75 Maverick, China, p.111.
76 As quoted in: Reichwein, China and Europe, p. 104.
77 Maverick, China, pp.130-131.
78 Jacques Philibert Rousselot de Surgy, Mélanges intéressans et curieux ou, abrégé d'histoire naturelle, morale, civile et politique de l'Asie, l'Afrique, l'Amérique et des terres polaires (Paris 1744- 66) 10 vols.
79 The twelve volumes by Rousselot de Surgy’s were already partly replicas of a very influential text on China, the“Description de l’empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise” (1735) by the Jesuit Jean Baptiste duHalde.
80 Maverick, China, p. 315.
81 Ibid., p. 34.
82 Jacques Philibert Rousselot de Surgy, Mélanges intéressans et curieux, ou abrégé d'histoire naturelle, morale, civile et politique de l'Asie, l'Afrique, l'Amérique et des terres polaires (Yverdon 1764- 66), 6. Vol. of 12, p. 236.
83 Maverick, China, p. 127.
84 Maverick, China, p. 131.
85 Davis, China, the Confucian Ideal, p. 540.
86 Pierre Poivre, Voyages d'un philosophe ou, observations sur les m?urs & les arts des peuples de l'Afrique, de l'Asie et de l'Amérique (Yverdon 1768).
87 Raymond Dawson, The Chinese Chameleon – An analysis of European conceptions of Chinese civilization (New York/ Toronto 1967), p. 55.
88 Lewis A. Maverick, Chinese Influences upon Quesnay and Turgot – Read before the Society for Oriental Studies, at Claremont, in April 1942 (Claremont 1942).
89 As quoted in: Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarin, p. 285.
90 Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments. Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment (Cambridge, Massachusetts/ London 2002), p. 67
91 P. J. van Winter, De Chinezen van Europa (Groningen 1965).
92 Ian Inkster, Science and Technology in History (London 1991), p. 48.
93 Frank A. Kafker/ Serenal L. Kafker, The Encyclopaedists as individuals: Biographical Dictionary of the Authors of the "Encyclopédie”; Studies on Voltaire (Oxford 1988), pp. XX- XXIII.
94 Jonathan Israel, The publishing of forbidden philosophical works in the Dutch republic (1666-1710) and their European distribution, p. 233, in: The Bookshop of the World – The role of the Low Countries in the book-trade 1473-1941, (ed) Lotte Hellinga et al. (Goy-Houten 2001), pp. 233- 243.
95 Elisabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an agent of Change: communications and cultural transformations in early-modern Europe, 2 vols. (Cambridge 1979), vol. I, p. 138.
96 Ulrich im Hof, Geschichte der Schweiz (Stuttgart, 6th ed.1997), pp. 87- 91.
97 Simone Zurbuchen, Patriotismus und Kosmopolitismus – Die Schweizer Aufkl?rung zwischen Tradition und Moderne (Zürich 2003), p. 50.
98 Jean-Pierre Perret, Les imprimeries d’Yverdon au XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Lausanne 1945).
99 De Surgy, Mélanges intéressans, (Yverdon 1764-1767).
100 René Louis de Voyer de Paulmy d’Argenson, Considérations sur le gouvernement ancien et présent de la France / par Mr. le Marquis d'Argenson (Yverdon/ Amsterdam 1764)
101 Julius Becker, Das deutsche Manchestertum – Eine Studie zur Geschichte des wirtschaftspolitischen Individualismus (Karlsruhe 1907), p. 7.
102 Oncken, August, Die Maxime laissez faire et laissez passer, ihr Ursprung, ihr Werden (Bern 1886), p. 61.
103 Ames, Rulership, p. 29.
104 Translated from the French: d’Argenson, Considérations (Amsterdam 1784), pp.
109- 110.
105 Poivre, Voyages (Yverdon 1768).
106 Francois Quesnay, Physiocratie, ou constitution naturelle du gouvernement le plus avantageux au genre humain / recueil publié par Du Pont, 6 vols. (Yverdon 1768- 69).
107 Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours, De l’origine et des progrès d’une science nouvelle 1768/ Dupont de Nemours ; publié avec notice et table analytique par A. Dubois (Paris 1910), p. 35.
108 Georg C. L. Schmidt, Der Bauer im Zeitalter des Frühkapitalismus – Die Wandlung der Schweizer Bauernwirtschaft im achtzehnten Jahrhundert und die Politik der ?konomischen Patrioten (Bern 1932), pp. 112- 118.
109 August Oncken, Der ?ltere Mirabeau und die ?konomische Gesellschaft in Bern (Bern 1886) p. 38.
110 Translated from the German version, in: Oncken, Mirabeau, p.21.
111 Ulrich im Hof, Albrecht von Haller. Staat und Gesellschaft, p. 48 in: Albrecht Haller (1708-1777), 10 Vortr?ge gehalten am Berner Haller-Symposium 6.-8. Oktober 1977 (Bern 1977), pp. 43- 66.
112 Kent G. Deng, Development and Its Deadlock in Imperial China 221 B.C.–1840 A.D., p.495 in: Economic development and cultural change, Vol. 51, No. 2, January 2003, pp. 479- 523.
113 Translated from German: im Hof, von Haller, p. 61.
114 Albrech von Haller, Usong. Eine Morgenl?ndische Geschichte (Bern 1771).
115 Max Widmann, Albrecht von Hallers Staatsromane (Biel 1894), pp. 59-60.
116 Haller, Usong, pp. 385- 418.
117 Ames, Rulership, p. 55.
118 Haller, Usong, pp. 117- 121.
119 Deng, Imperial China, p. 490.
120 Widmann, Staatsromane, p. 48.
121 Ibid., pp. 47, 49.
122 Ibid., p. 52.
123 Haller, Usong, pp. 406- 407.
124 Haller, Usong, p. 406.
125 Deng, Imperial China, p. 497.
126 Fisher, Containing China?, p. 549.
127 Hobson, Eastern Origins, chapter 11.
128 Manfred Hettling, Geschichtlichkeit – Zwerge auf den Schultern von Riesen, pp. 91-92 in: Jakob Tanner et al, Eine kleine Geschichte der Schweiz. Der Bundesstaat und seine Traditionen (Frankfurt 1998), pp. 94- 95, 100- 105.
129 Walther Rupli, Zollreform und Bundesreform in der Schweiz 1815- 1848 (Zürich 1949), p. 188.
130 Matthias Weishaupt, Bauern, Hirten und ?frume edle puren?. Bauern und Bauernstaatsideologie in der sp?tmittelalterlichen Eidgenossenschaft und der nationalen Geschichtsschreibung der Schweiz (Basel/ Frankfurt 1992), pp. 86-95.
131 Eduard Fueter, Die Schweiz seit 1848 (Zürich/ Leipzig 1928), p. 150.
132 Rupli, Zollreform, p. 196.
133 As quoted in: John Morley, The Life of Richard Cobden, 2 vols. (London 1881) Vol. 1, p. 28.
134 Friedrich List, Gesammelte Werke, 10 vols. (Berlin 1935), Vol. 5, p. 348.

ore elevated character of husbandry life than I expected to see. Enormous farm-houses and barns; plenty of out-houses of every kind; and the horses and cows are superior to those of the English farmers.”133

Conclusion

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Conclusion

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Conclusion

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